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I
INTRODUCTION
Civil juries are under heavy attack. The critics allege that juries are
capricious, biased toward plaintiffs, unpredictable, and overgenerous in their
verdicts. They find juries often incompetent to pass judgment on issues
brought before them, particularly in complex cases such as medical
malpractice and products liability. Further, the critics claim that jury trials
add to the already crippling delays and backlogs plaguing the American court
system.'
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1. Many of the critics tie together the ill effects of jury verdicts and the idea of a "litigation
explosion"-or at least an explosion in tort litigation. The negative effects ofjury decisionmaking,
however, are rarely mentioned in this regard without also including plaintiffs' lawyers and the
contingency fee system. These things allegedly work together synergistically to bring more and
more lawsuits into court, especially those involving complex issues that juries are ill equipped to
handle.
The critics' logic says that a proplaintiff bias on the part ofjuries (especially in cases involving
deep pocket defendants) along with a pronounced tendency for juries to award high monetary
damages encourage more people to sue. They also encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to seek out and
bring more suits. Most of these suits, the critics contend, are frivolous.
According to Marc Galanter,
To observers who think America is in a litigation crisis, juries are part of the trouble. At the
least they are a cumbersome obstacle to judicial efficiency, preventing needed streamlining
of procedures. But to most critics, it is not procedural cumbrousness that is the sin ofjuries,
but their incompetence, arbitrariness and sentimental bias toward claimants.
M. Galanter, Jury Shadows: Reflections on the Civil Jury and the "Litigation Explosion" (revised
version) (paper presented at the ChiefJustice Earl Warren Conference, Boston, June 12-15, 1986).
To illustrate Galanter's point, an article in an insurance industry magazine said the following
under the subheading "The Growing Tendency to Sue:"
Are Americans more quick to sue? Are we now a more litigious society? Do we have a
population that believes it is at the mercy of big business, big money, and big government;
and, given the opportunity, does the common citizen feel he or she is entitled to milk the
system through the courts? Forbes magazine cites the 1984 average product liability award
as $1.07 million and the average medical malpractice award as $950,000 and reports
Americans now look on a civil suit as a kind of lottery to be played whenever they can. The
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These are not simply abstract criticisms of the jury as an institution. The
attackers argue that in the context of the "litigation explosion"-an
unprecedented, dramatic upsurge of civil litigation 2 -the failings of civil juries
have brought our society to the point of crisis, especially in the area of
insurance. There has been, we are told, an "insurance famine": 3 Liability
insurance in the mid-1980's was often unavailable, or available only at much
reduced coverage and at a significantly higher price.
In this view, juries are the causal link between the failings of the civil
justice system and the crisis manifested by the insurance famine. That logic
runs as follows: Professionals (mainly physicians), manufacturers, large and
small businesses, local governments, schools, and others began facing
significantly greater numbers of liability claims and lawsuits during the 1980's,
many of which were frivolous. At the same time, juries became increasingly
more likely to decide in favor of plaintiffs, and to award them ever-increasing
amounts of money.
4
magazine reports there was one private civil lawsuit filed for every 15 Americans during
1984.
Caught in the middle is the insurance industry, which many see as a "Deep Pocket"
litigant-with unlimited resources to richly compensate individuals for any degree of injury.
The result is what many analysts call "a suing society." Juries are also caught up in the
trend, and what was a once-rare-million-dollar award is now a common occurrence.
The Search for Available Insurance: Where Is It?, 61 J. AM. INS. 1, 2-3 (1985).
On June 6, 1986, USA Today's editorial focused on the interrelationships among litigation,
insurance, lawyers, and juries:
The insurance crunch has become a crisis .... Everybody in the USA suddenly seems to
want to sue anybody with liability insurance coverage. The explosion of litigation has
choked court dockets. And too few lawyers tell potential clients that some cases are a waste
of time.
After all, lawyers get up to 50 percent of judgments . . . . And too few juries look
reasonably, responsibly, and with restraint at claims from so-called victims who ask for
money to pay for their "pain and suffering."
From 1980 to 1984, jury awards of more than $1 million increased by nearly 200
percent.
That's phenomenal. It's also frightening .... Nobody wants to stand in the way of real
victims receiving real value for real injury. But litigants with minimal complaints, hoping for
huge judgments for pain and suffering are too willing to pay enormous contingency fees to
lawyers who routinely shoot craps with the justice system.
Hold Down Awards to Ease This Crisis, USA Today, June 6, 1986, at 12A, col. 1.
These symbolic themes concerning greedy, undeserving plaintiffs, greedy lawyers, and overly
sympathetic, generous juries appear throughout the attacks on juries.
2. See, e.g., Malott, Americas Liability Explosion: Can l'e Afford the Cost?, 52 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE
DAY 180 (1986); McCormick, The American Tort System: A Time to Rebalance the Scales ofJustice 52 VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY 267 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Reid, Insurance Famine Plagues Nation, Wash. Post, Feb. 23, 1986, at AI, col. 1.
4. According to Peter Huber of the Manhattan Institute, "the plaintiff's probability of winning
has .. .risen steadily. The likelihood of success rose from 20 to 30 percent in a product case in the
1960s to more than 50 percent in the 1980s, with similar increases in other classes of lawsuit." P.
HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 10 (1988). In addition, he
confidently claimed that
there has been sharp growth in the size of awards. The average judgment in all tort cases
rose from an inflation-adjusted $50,000 in the early 1960s to more than $250,000 in the
early 1980s-a fivefold increase. The inflation-adjusted median-the amount exceeded in
half of all judgments-has been rising steadily too, by more than 80 percent in the same
period.
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Continuing the logic, these businesses, professionals, and others turned to
their insurance carriers to defend them and to cover their losses. This led to
an unprecedented number of claims made on insurance policies, which placed
the insurance industry itself in peril. As a result, insurance companies
discontinued covering certain lines of business or particular geographic areas,
cut back on the coverage offered, and increased the cost of coverage still
available. 5 Reinsurers, which provide the second and third layers of
insurance, retreated as well, finding "America . . . as unpredictable from an
underwriter's point of view as a banana republic." '6
This insurance famine forced professionals, businesses, local govern-
ments, and others who require liability insurance to operate to restrict or
eliminate goods and services. Even essential services like medical care and
crucial products like vaccines were not spared. 7
The critics would resolve the crisis caused by juries and the civil justice
system through immediate and substantial, if not radical, reform.8 Among
other things, their reform agenda includes significant limitations on what
juries can hear, and on what they may decide in the cases that reach them. A
few reformers have even argued for the effective elimination of civil juries,9
and a radical handful think the tort system in which juries decide is itself so
flawed that it should be replaced by a contract system.' 0
Typical of the reforms on the agenda are those that began appearing in
press accounts throughout 1986. For instance, Business Week reported that
"[s]tate legislators across the U.S. are making basic changes in liability law-
changes that will make it harder to sue anyone charged with causing an
injury."" Among those changes were limits on noneconomic damages, mod-
ification of joint and several liability, and specific damage limits for medical
5. Id. Again, looking to Huber's commentary on the crisis, we find the following with regard to
medical malpractice which illustrates the causal logic:
Insurers jacked up their rates, reduced coverage limits, and increased deductibles. A . . .
crisis climaxed in the early 1980s. A 1985 announcement by the Chubb Insurance
Corporation was typical. "Our past reports have said enough about the mistakes we made
in trying to underwrite, price, and reserve medical malpractice coverages . . . [we have]
created an unwished for monument to fifteen years of ... too optimistic belief that Chubb
could somehow take the measure of the juridical inflationary engine that has been driving
the cost of medical malpractice insurance .... During 1984 we stopped writing medical
malpractice business." And that was that. "We expect this to be our last comment on the
problems," Chubb tersely concluded.
Id. at 138.
6. Id. at 141 ("In 1984, London reinsurers labeled the U.S. liability market 'uninsurable' and
started a mass exodus. By 1985, Lloyd's, the world's biggest reinsurer, was scrambling to get out.
'The liability insurance scene in the United States has lost all predictability,' declared one member,
Iand therefore has become impossible to assess in terms of premium rates.' . . . By 1985, ninety
reinsurers-almost one-third of the companies that were doing business worldwide in 1983-were
gone.").
7. Id. at 3-5; Liability Crisis Complicates Contraception, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1986, at B8, col. 2.
8. P. HUBER, supra note 4, at 228.
9. J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, THE BLAME GAME 113-39 (1987).
10. P. HUBER, supra note 4, at 224-27; Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Casefor Contract, 1976 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 87 (1976); Epstein, Medical Malpractice, Imperfect Information, and the Contractual
Foundation for Medical Services, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 201.
11. Moskowitz, From Coast to Coast, the Push is on to Limit Liability, Bus. WK., Apr. 28, 1986, at 28.
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malpractice cases.' 2 Other reports would also note limits on noneconomic
damages (especially pain and suffering), modifications of joint and several lia-
bility, and damage limits in malpractice cases along with various provisions to
limit lawyers' fees.' 3
Such reforms were usually not passed individually, but were included as a
part of reform measure packages attempting to address as much of the reform
agenda as possible. The 1987 Omnibus Texas Tort Reform Act 14 provides a
good example. Designed as a comprehensive reform package, it includes pro-
visions with regard to the following matters:
a. privolous pleadings/claims;
b. venue;
c. comparative responsibility and joint/several liability;
d. exemplary/punitive damages;
e. charitable/nonprofit organizations' directors and officers;
f. directors and officers of for-profit corporations;
g. public officials;
h. vaccines/drugs;
i. municipal proprietary/governmental functions;
j. certain governmental emergency actions;
k. prejudgment interest;
1. effective implementation dates;
m. direct/accelerated appeals;
n. constitutional amendment;
o. charitable immunity/liability. 15
12. Id.
13. Green, Tort Reforms Adopted in 1986, J. COM., Apr. 28, 1987, at 15A, col. 2; Barron, 40
Legislatures Act to Readjust Liability Rules, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
14. The 1987 Texas tort reform laws consist of (1) Act ofJune 16, 1987, ch. 2, 1987 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 71 (Vernon) (Tex. S.B. 5, 70th Leg., 1st Called Sess.; formerly Tex. S.B. 287, 70th Leg.,
Reg. Sess.) [hereinafter Omnibus Tort Reform Law or Bill]; (2) Act ofJune 16, 1987, ch. 3, 1987
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 99 (Vernon) (Tex. S.B. 6, 70th Leg., 1st Called Sess.; formerly Tex. S.B. 290,
70th Leg., Reg. Sess.) [hereinafter Prejudgment Interest Tort Reform Law or Bill]; (3) Act of June
16, 1987, ch. 4, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 101 (Vernon) (Tex. S.B. 7, 70th Leg., 1st Called Sess.;
formerly Tex. S.B. 329, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess.); (4) Act ofJune 16, 1987. ch. 370, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 3581 (Vernon) (Tex. S.B. 202, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess.); (5) Act ofJune 17, 1987, ch. 424, 1987
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3943 (Vernon) (Tex. S.B. 260, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess.); and (6) Act of June 16,
1987, Tex. S.J. Res. 26, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. No. 8, A-7 (Vernon). The
associated 1987 Texas insurance reform laws consist of: (1) Act ofJune 16, 1987, ch. 1, 1987 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. I (Vernon) (Tex. S.B. 2, 70th Leg., 1st Called Sess.; formerly Tex. S.B. 291, 70th
Leg., Reg. Sess.); (2) Act ofJune 16, 1987, ch. 5, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 103 (Vernon) (Tex. S.B.
8, 70th Leg., 1st Called Sess.; formerly Tex. S.B. 688, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess.); and (3) Act ofJune 16,
1987, ch. 6, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 107 (Vernon) (Tex. S.B. 9, 70th Leg., 1st Called Sess.;
formerly Tex. S.B. 175, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess.); see Montford & Barber, 1987 Texas Tort Reform: The
Quest for a Fairer and More Predictable Texas Civil Justice System, 25 Hous. L. REV. 59 (1988).
15. Montford & Barber, supra note 14, at 66 (footnote omitted).
As broad ranging as the Texas reforms are, not all of the items on the Texas reformers' agenda
were passed by the legislature. Not enacted were proposed reforms dealing with the following:
q. affidavits of noninvolvement;
r. statute of limitation (minors);
s. attorneys' contingent fees;
t. periodic/structured payments;
u. limitations on non-economic damages;
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The current attack on jury competence must be analyzed within the
context of public policy formation, with particular attention directed to the
rhetoric of crisis and the politics of civil justice reform. This inquiry will
focus on the criticisms of juries with regard to what Edith Greene calls the
products ofjury decisionmaking (patterns in who wins and in how much money
they win) rather than the process of decisionmaking.' 6 The remainder of this
article is divided into two parts. The first draws upon the political science
literature to provide a framework for examining the politics of the insurance
crisis. This analysis emphasizes the role of crisis rhetoric in political debate
over controversial public issues, and the manner in which issues are elevated
first to the public agenda and then to the policy agenda. Within this
framework, the second part of the article examines the allegations made
against civil juries, identifies the sources of these criticisms, and evaluates the
evidence used to justify the proposals for substantial reform.
II
JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF CRISIS AND REFORM
"Proclaiming that we have a government of laws, we have, in jury cases, created a government of
often ignorant and prudiced men. " 17
Attacks on civil juries are nothing new, and there is nothing especially
different about the criticisms made now as compared to the past. Over fifty
years ago, Jerome Frank severely criticized civil juries in the United States and
argued for a British-style circumscription of the jury's role in civil cases.
Frank strongly preferred decisions made by judges rather than laypeople,
finding juries unpredictable and inconsistent. Juries, he said, are ad hoc
decisionmakers, brought together to hear but one case with no knowledge of
what has happened in like cases before and no concern for what might happen
in the future.' 8
In addition, Frank thought juries are likely to be capricious and
prejudiced. They ignore legal rules and doctrines, allowing nonlegal and
often irrelevant factors, such as the socioeconomic status of parties and
witnesses, to sway their judgment. He even thought juries were prejudiced
against what today are called "deep pocket" defendants: "That the defendant
is a wealthy corporation and the plaintiff is a poor boy . . .often determine
who will win or lose."' 9
v. distribution of exemplary/punitive damages;
w. collateral benefits;
x. liability for certain use of land (recreational);
y. definition of "tangible property" for purposes of governmental liability
Id. at 67 (footnote omitted).
16. Greene, On juries and Damage Awards: The Process of Decisionmaking, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1989, at 225.
17. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 178 (1949).
18. Id. at 174.
19. Id. at 177-78.
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Finally, Frank found the jury incapable of performing its basic function as
factfinder: to weigh the evidence and decide the truth of the matter. In his
view, an experienced judge would perform factfinding better than jurors
because jurors are likely to be gullible and manipulable. 20 In fact, he believed
juries "make the orderly administration of justice virtually impossible"
because they are so hopelessly incompetent. 2 1
Given that severe criticism of juries is not a new phenomenon, two
important questions arise. First, why have these criticisms arisen again in the
mid-1980's? Second, how should we interpret the latest attack? Litan, Swire,
and Winston offer an answer to the first question, noting that "[p]ublic
concern over the efficiency and fairness of the civil liability system ebbs and
flows with the apparently cyclical performance of the property and casualty
insurance industry. The previous insurance 'crisis,' for example, occurred in
the mid-1970s, when liability premiums also escalated and coverage was
curtailed." 2 2 In other words, attacks on the civil justice system and on juries
follow the insurance industry's boom and bust business cycle. On the
upswing, insurance coverage is widely available and low-priced, and attacks on
juries and the civil justice system wane. On the downswing, coverage is
restricted and high-priced or unavailable, and attacks on the civil justice
system and juries increase.
During the mid-1980's, the insurance industry found itself in a deep
trough in its business cycle, and consumers experienced the attendant
restrictions on the availability of insurance. Attacks on juries and the civil
justice system increased correspondingly. The critics claimed a direct causal
relationship between actions in the civil justice system, especially the products
of jury decisionmaking, and the availability and cost of insurance. Ultimately,
however, the causes of the boom and bust business cycle of the insurance
industry remain unclear, even among the experts. No systematic empirical
evidence exists to establish a direct causal relationship between the products
of jury decisionmaking and the cyclical nature of the insurance industry.
According to Scott Harrington:
Theoretical work does not . . .provide a clear explanation for underwriting cycles.
Empirical work also leaves something to be desired, perhaps because of the difficulty
of using time series data for several decades to estimate structural relationships that
are likely to alter because of changes in types of coverage, regulation, and other
factors. 2 3
A better understanding of the current attack on juries flows from an
interpretive political analysis that emphasizes the role of policy formation.
Current criticisms of juries must be seen as part of a highly politicized and
hotly contested public policy debate, not as the mere theoretical musings of
20. Id. at 177, 177n.
21. Id. at 181.
22. Litan, Swire & Winston, The U.S. Liability, System: Background and Trends, in LIABILITY:
PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 1-2 (R. Litan & C. Winston eds. 1988).
23. Harrington, Prices and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND
POLICY, supra note 22, at 77.
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academics. A political perspective advances the difficult process of separating
polemics, political rhetoric, and outright propaganda from the reality of
patterns and changes in the products of jury decisionmaking.
A. Symbolic Politics and the Idea of Crisis
The idea of a crisis is pivotal to understanding the political nature of the
debate over the relationship between civil juries and the insurance famine. In
ordinary discourse, crises are dire situations. When a crisis occurs,
something unforeseen happens that so disrupts normal social, political, or
economic life that it demands an immediate and extraordinary response by
public authorities. An effective example is a natural disaster-such as a
tornado hitting a community-and the immediate, extraordinary responses
that come from public officials and agencies. 24
The insurance situation has been characterized in such dire terms as a
threat to "the fabric of American life" 25 and "an engine of social
destruction."2 6 The alleged crisis nature of the situation is used to justify a
package of substantial changes. Most of the political debate, then, has
centered on whether a crisis actually exists. Such debate on the merits,
however, overlooks a more important underlying issue-what it means to
characterize a situation as a crisis in the public policy arena. What makes this
particular situation a crisis? What is it about the patterns and changes in the
products of jury decisionmaking that make juries a cause of this crisis and
what evidence is used to substantiate these claims?
In addressing what it means to characterize a situation as a crisis, Murray
Edelman argues that the labeling process is not as simple as it appears,
particularly with respect to social, political, or economic phenomena.2 7 There
is no ready consensus on what constitutes a crisis in terms of these
phenomena, as there may be with a natural disaster. Labeling a social,
political, or economic phenomenon a crisis may be an arbitrary act because
the phenomenon can usually be characterized as either unique or recurring.
If an event is recurring, and if the system is thought capable of correcting
itself, then there is no crisis and no corresponding need to identify and
remedy the causes in response. On the other hand, if a situation is unique, its
24. See Brass, The Political Uses of Crises: The Bihar Famine of 1966-67, 45 J. ASIAN STUD. 245
(1986); R. Hayden & S. Daniels, The Cultural Logic of a Manufactured Crisis: The Great American
Liability Insurance Famine of 1986 (June 14, 1987) (unpublished manuscript delivered at the 1987
Meeting of the Law & Society Ass'n, Washington, D.C.).
25. Kilpatrick, Liability Insurance Crisis Perils Our VIery Way of Life, Chi. Sun-Times, Apr. 10, 1986, at
49.
26. P. HUBER, supra note 4, at 221.
27. M. EDELMAN, POLITICAL LANGUAGE: WORDS THAT SUCCEED AND POLICIES THAT FAIL 43-55
(1977).
The word "crisis" connotes a development that is unique and threatening. When applied to
political events, the term is a form ofproblematic categorization because the development it
highlights can also be perceived as recurring rather than singular and as an instance of
arbitrary labeling. What events mean for policy formation depends on whether they are
defined as exceptional.
Id. at 43.
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causes must be identified; once isolated, the causes are vulnerable to major
policy initiatives.
The political debate over jury competence neatly illustrates these general
propositions. The situation characterized as a crisis is the availability,
adequacy, and affordability of insurance-something so important that even
the production and delivery of essential goods and services depend on it.
Having labeled the situation a crisis, the critics proceed to locate its causes in
the civil justice system, particularly in the products of jury decisionmaking.
Consequently, the attackers have the jury, and its competence, firmly fixed in
their cross-hairs.
But there are two sides to the labeling coin. By calling a situation a crisis,
and by identifying certain causes, the labeler can disavow responsibility for its
occurrence and mask the true recurring nature of the so-called unique
phenomenon. With respect to the insurance crisis, the problem may be
rooted in the industry's boom and bust business cycle. By labeling the
situation a crisis, however, the critics focus the debate on causes outside the
industry itself. In Edelman's view, this labeling is appropriately characterized
as a political act of blame-shifting. 28
Once the political nature of labeling is exposed, three important insights
emerge. First, some crises may be "created semantically and self-consciously
by groups who engender widespread anxiety about an alleged threat that may
or may not be real." 29 Second, given that crises can be manufactured, the
manufacturer has two major tools at his or her disposal: reason and emotion.
Appealing to emotion has the strategic advantage of derailing the audience's
critical faculties, making persuasion more likely.
Such rhetoric has been described as the "tactical use of passion,"
provoking "feeling rather than thought."30  It is a symbolic appeal to
prejudices and unexamined assumptions. Reliable, systematically collected
empirical data are not likely to defeat claims based upon common sense,
which, in Clifford Geertz' words, "rests its [case] on the assertion that it is not
a case at all . . . . The world is its authority." 3' A well-structured common
sense argument coupled with the selective use of graphic illustrations is likely
to preempt the consideration of even a substantial body of data that
contradicts the argument. 32 The reason should be clear: If everyone knows
the way in which the world works, what is the point of examining the matter?
The graphic examples simply illustrate the obvious-what is known to be true.
Indeed, how could anyone with any common sense deny that this is the way
things are?
28. Id. at 45-47.
29. Id. at 47.
30. F. BAILEY, THE TACTICAL USES OF PASSION 23 (1983); see also R. Hayden & S. Daniels, supra
note 24, at 3-8, 18-19.
31. See C. GEERTZ, Common Sense as a Cultural System, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 75 (1983).
32. R. Hayden & S. Daniels, supra note 24, at 18-23.
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There is a third insight that flows from recognizing the political nature of
labeling: It is essential to identify who benefits when a phenomenon is called
a crisis. 33 This observation is particularly helpful in evaluating the recent
round of criticisms of civil juries. The attacks are in reality part of a heated
political battle over how to characterize the sudden lack of available,
affordable, and adequate insurance in the mid-1980's. The stakes in this
debate are high. The winning characterization will determine the nature of
subsequent public policy initiatives, with far-reaching consequences for the
interested parties.
Specifically, the opponents of crisis labeling are primarily consumer
groups and trial lawyers' associations. They blame the boom and bust nature
of the insurance industry's business cycle and find the causes of the cycle
within the industry itself.3 4 From this perspective, there is little or no
connection between what happens in the civil justice system and the current
insurance problems; these groups make no criticisms of juries. In fact, this
side of the debate defends the civil jury vigorously.35 Instead of reforming the
civil justice system, their answer to current problems lies in greater regulation
of the insurance industry. 36
The proponents of crisis labeling have included the insurance industry, the
Reagan Administration, and various business and professional groups (most
prominently, the American Medical Association). This coalition clearly
blames the civil justice system and calls for fundamental reform as the only
solution to current insurance problems. By doing so, they divert attention
away from the causal role of the industry's boom and bust business cycle, and
from the solution of substantially greater industry regulation. The attacks on
jury competence are a key part of this strategy. In short, if the crisis-labelers
prevail, policy initiatives will focus exclusively on civil justice reform, thereby
defusing any effort to impose potentially damaging regulations on the
insurance industry. If the opponents prevail, such regulation would be
compelled.
33. M. EDELMAN, supra note 27, at 46 ("People who benefit from a crisis are easily able to explain
it to themselves and to the mass public in terms that mask or minimize their own contributions and
incentives, while highlighting outside threats and unexpected occurrences."); see also Those W1ho Pay
Most Lobby to Change Way Suits Are Tried, Damages Awarded, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1986, at 2, col. 1.
34. See, e.g., J. GUINTHER, THEJURY IN AMERICA 193-96 (1987);J. RUITrENBERG & S. FELDMAN, AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF UNAVAILABILITY AND UNAFFORDABILITY OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE 37-42 (1986); Burrow & Collins, Insurance "Crisis --Texas Style: The Case for
Insurance Reform, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 759 (1987); Habush, The Insurance "Crisis": Reality or Alyth? A
Plaintifs' Lawyer's Perspective, 64 DEN. U.L. REV. 641, 646-47 (1988); see also Gaines, Suits Latest Fallout
from Liability Crisis, Chi. Trib., Mar. 27, 1988, § 7, at 1, col. 5 (separate federal antitrust suits filed by
eight states in U.S. District Court in San Francisco against insurance companies); Attorneys General
Dispute Insurance "Crisis, - Chi. Daily L. Bull., May 30, 1986, at 1.
35. See, e.g., J. GUINTHER. supra note 34, at 105, 219-31; Burrows & Collins, supra note 34, at 789-
91.
36. See, e.g., Burrows & Collins, supra note 34, at 793-95.
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B. An Agenda-Building Perspective
One way to confirm the political nature of the debate is to dissect the
strategies used to bring the insurance crisis to public attention. An agenda-
building perspective provides a framework for this analysis. According to
Cobb and Elder, "[i]nstead of trying to debate the merits of a conflict in terms
of which side has the 'best' or more persuasive argument, the agenda-building
perspective would focus on the way issues become defined initially . . . [and]
[t]he techniques that issue leaders use to gain victory for their group." 37
There are two important agendas in this perspective: the public or
systemic, and the policy or institutional. The first is broader and more
abstract than the second. 38 It "consists of all issues that are commonly
perceived by members of the political community as meriting public attention
and as involving, matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing
governmental authority."3 9 The policy or institutional agenda is "that set of
items explicitly up for the active and serious consideration of authoritative
decision-makers." 40 The public agenda is the more important of the two.
According to Cobb and Elder, few issues emerge on the policy agenda without
first appearing on the public agenda.4' The important question for policy
formation, then, is how something gets on the public agenda.
Cobb and Elder argue that "the most common method [used to achieve
status on the public agenda] is the manufacturing of an issue by one or more
of the contending parties who perceive an unfavorable bias in the distribution
of . . . resources." 4 2 Once an issue is created, three things must happen
before it gains access to the public agenda: (1) widespread attention or
awareness must be attracted; (2) a sizable proportion of the public must share
the concern that action is required to deal with the issue; and (3) the
perception must be shared that the issue is an appropriate concern for some
governmental unit and falls within the bounds of its authority.43
To acquire the necessary public attention, supporters of the issue "must
have either access to the mass media or the resources necessary to reach
people." 44 The skillful use of rhetoric is often essential to success. 45
Furthermore, to foster the popular conviction that governmental action is not
only possible but necessary to resolve the issue, "a significant number of
groups or persons will normally be required . . . [since] the greater the size of
the audience to which an issue can be enlarged, the greater the likelihood that
37. R. COBB & C. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE DYNAMICS OF AGENDA
BUILDING 81 (1983).
38. Id. at 14.
39. Id. at 85.
40. Id. at 86.
41. Id. at 87.
42. Id. at 82.
43. Id. at 86.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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it will attain systemic (public) agenda standing and thus access to a formal (or
policy) agenda." 4 6
To accomplish this end, an issue's supporters will cast it as having a broad
social significance, with long-term or fundamental implications. The issue will
be defined in a nontechnical fashion, and as lacking a clear precedent. The
latter is especially important because it creates a sense of urgency and "issues
that gain the attention of the mass public must be developed rapidly ....
[T]he quicker an issue can be converted into an emotional issue, the greater
the likelihood that it will gain public visibility." 47
These ideas about agenda-building and symbolic politics provide a useful
framework for examining the current attack on jury competence within the
debate over the insurance crisis and civil justice reform. This framework will
be used throughout the remainder of the article to interpret the allegations
made against juries; to investigate the sources of those allegations and the
interests of those making the allegations; and to evaluate the political nature
and the veracity of the evidence used to substantiate the attack. The idea of
agenda-building will be especially important to the discussion of the sources
of the allegations against juries, while the ideas of symbolic politics and crisis
rhetoric will play a major role in the evaluation of the evidence used to
substantiate the claims about juries.
III
THE ATTACK ON JURIES
A. The Current Allegations
Six basic allegations about civil juries make up the current attack. Not all
of them are consistent with each other.48 First, juries are blamed for the
recent alleged litigation explosion. In this view, juries are strongly biased in
favor of plaintiffs, and they award large money damages. Expectations of easy
victory and handsome awards encourage lawyers and their clients to file more
and more lawsuits, fueling the explosion of civil litigation. The critics' logic is
that a proplaintiff bias on the part of juries, particularly in cases involving
deep pocket defendants, along with a significant trend of increasingly larger
awards encourage more people to sue. Additionally, this encourages
plaintiffs' attorneys working on a contingency fee basis to seek out and bring
more suits to increase their own incomes. 49 More often than not, it is the
defendant's insurance company that pays the judgment in this increasing
number of suits with larger and larger awards. These expectations also set the
standards for the even larger number of settlements short of trial, and
together with high jury awards they have curtailed the availability, adequacy,
46. Id. at 110.
47. Id. at 124.
48. N. Vidmar, On Libel and the Civil Jury (unpublished manuscript delivered at the Annual
Meeting of the Law and Society Ass'n, June 11-14, 1987).
49. See generally supra note I.
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and affordability of insurance. 50 As insurance company executive William
McCormick said: "Decided cases are only the tip of the iceberg; they directly
affect thousands of other cases that get settled before going to court, not to
mention acting as a stimulant for ever more lawsuits." 5'
Second, the propensity of juries to favor plaintiffs is increasing along with
the size of the jury awards. 52 This naive, straight-line view sees some golden
age in the past when plaintiffs rarely won and were awarded only modest
amounts of money when they did. The idea of a historically significant change
is conveniently linked to the concept of crisis-the idea that the current
situation is unique rather than recurring. The change calls for a drastic
response to restore us to the earlier state of grace.
Third, juries are not competent to decide issues in complex, lengthy trials.
Critics claim that jury attention span decreases in long trials, especially
antitrust, products liability, or medical malpractice cases, which entail
complicated technical evidence. In addition, juries are likely to be misled or
confused in such cases by the "battle of experts" over the technical evidence,
thereby eliminating any chance for a fair, rational decision. 53 Even worse,
juries may be asked to decide on complex issues for which there is no hard
technical evidence but only claims about indirect effects and statistical
probabilities. 54 Uninformed, gullible lay jurors may accept expert testimony
uncritically, ignore it, or just not understand it at all.5 5
Fourth, juries are capricious. In other words, the jury system is a bizarre
lottery, lacking predictability and consistency in who wins and how much
winners are awarded. This allegation has special relevance for the high-
visibility, big-ticket areas of medical malpractice and products liability.
The fifth assertion superficially contradicts the fourth in claiming that
juries are biased. Rather than being a lottery, the products of jury
decisionmaking are seen as consistently favoring some interests to the
detriment of others. One of the oldest and most widely asserted claims is that
juries are biased against businesses, professionals, governmental bodies, or
other so-called deep pockets. In other words, juries will generally decide in
favor of individual plaintiffs suing deep pocket defendants, and will
consistently award these plaintiffs large amounts of money. This charge
brings forth a vision of innocent defendants confronting undeserving
plaintiffs with greedy lawyers.
50. See, e.g., Malott, supra note 2; McCormick, supra note 2, at 268-69.
51. McCormick, supra note 2, at 268.
52. See, e.g., P. HUBER, supra note 4. See also D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA, J. KAKALIK & M. PETERSON,
TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 12-21 (1987).
53. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, supra note 9, at 33-42 ("You have to wonder, if you or a
loved one were critically injured and permanently disabled, whether you'd want your financial future
to turn on a battle of warring experts-with a thoroughly confused jury caught in between."). Id. at
42.
54. See, e.g., Huber, Environmental Hazards and Liability Law, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND
POLICY, supra note 22, at 141-43.
55. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, supra note 9, at 34, 42.
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While contradictory at one level, the fifth assertion is similar to the fourth
in one important respect. The underlying logic is that juries are incompetent
to decide cases fairly and rationally. The difference between the fourth and
fifth allegations lies in the presumed result ofjury incompetence. The fourth
assertion sees chaos resulting. The fifth assertion sees consistency and order,
but consistency based on inappropriate criteria. Juries have also recently
been charged with bias in their decisions against members of dissimilar races,
and with favoritism toward certain socioeconomic classes. 56
The final assertion is that little or nothing can be done to improve the
performance of civil juries. The problem is the inherent inability of lay jurors
to determine liability and to award money. There are two variations to this
claim. The first negatively compares jury decisionmaking to judicial
decisionmaking and argues for severe restrictions on juries when they are
used. The second goes further, arguing for various alternative means for
handling civil disputes outside the courts altogether.
B. Sources
The current attack on juries accompanied the public declaration in 1985
by insurance, business, and professional groups that the lack of available,
affordable, and adequate insurance had become a crisis. With this
declaration, civil justice reform rather than insurance regulation emerged first
on the public agenda, and later on the policy agenda. The chorus of voices
included prominent members of the business community; insurance
companies and the consulting firms they retained; national trade associations;
the national media; and coalitions of local affected industries. For instance, in
a widely distributed speech, reform proponent Robert Malott, chairman of
FMC Corporation and chair of the Business Roundtable, characterized the
United States as "the most litigious society in the world." 57 After asserting
the existence of the litigation explosion and castigating juries for giving out
"absurdly generous liability awards," 58 Malott said:
Among those hardest hit by the surge in litigation has been the insurance industry.
Last year (1984), the property-casuahy insurance industry suffered a staggering pre-
tax loss of nearly four billion dollars-it's [sic] worst loss since the San Francisco
earthquake of 1906. To halt the red ink, insurance companies have resorted to a host
of defensive measures-hiking rates, canceling coverage, narrowing the conditions of
their policies and, in some cases, simply closing up shop.
As a result, businesses nationwide are facing a precipitous decline in liability
coverage-if they can get coverage at all-at costs that range anywhere from 25 to 500
percent over their previous premiums.
FMC, as an example, had its premium increased 350 percent this year (1985) for less
than one-half the coverage we enjoyed in 1984. 5 9
56. Id. at 25.
57. Malott, supra note 2, at 180.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Malott was not the only visible spokesman on this issue. William
McCormick, chairman and chief executive officer of Fireman's Fund Insurance
Companies, also made a widely distributed speech about the crisis and its
causes in which he complained about the excesses of the civil justice system
and the products of jury decisionmaking. 60 Both men wrote other pieces on
this topic that appeared in national magazines or large-circulation
newspapers. 61
By mid- to late 1985, reports of the crisis and its purported origins
appeared in an increasing number of newspaper and magazine stories and
editorials. 62 Typically, these pieces focused on the plight of those with acute
problems in purchasing needed insurance, and summarized the possible
causes. During this time, business publications also devoted greater attention
to the crisis, finding its cause in the civil justice system-particularly in the
products of jury decisionmaking. For instance, Forbes and the Wall Street
Journal published strongly worded attacks on juries in mid- to late 1985.63 By
the end of 1985, editorials were calling for tort reform legislation to address
the crisis, with juries being among the chief culprits. 64 In early 1986, press
coverage peaked. Major cover stories in U.S. News & World Report and Time
reported that the critics were making serious allegations against juries in
examining potential causes of the problem. 65 Similar reports continued
throughout 1986 and 1987.66
The issue seemed to have exploded onto the public agenda, and by mid-
1986 the insurance crisis-with its attendant causes and remedies-appeared
to be an accepted fact. Moreover, the issue was established on the policy
agenda, with "more than 1,600 [tort] reform measures . . . introduced in all
44 state legislatures that were in session [in 1986]. Twenty-one of the 38
adjourned legislatures have enacted significant reforms." 6 7
60. McCormick, supra note 2.
61. See, e.g., Malott, Let's Restore Balance to Product Liability Law, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1983,
at 67; Malott, Product Liability: The Law of Hazards, ENTERPRISE, Dec. 1983/Jan. 1984, at 22;
McCormick, Civil Justice and Common Sense, Chi. Trib., Mar. 2, 1986, § 5, at 2, col. 4.
62. See, e.g., Andresky, A World HWithout Insurance?, FORBES, July 15, 1985, at 40; King, Stopping the
Bloodbath in Medical Malpractice, Bus. WK., Apr. 22, 1985, at 93; Lawmakers Urged to Act on N. Y Liability
Crisis, J. COM., Aug. 27, 1985, at 8A, col. 4; Fibich, Insurance Squeeze Putting Businesses at Risk, Dallas
Times Herald, Dec. 31, 1985, at AI, col. 1; Tiede, Vulnerable Groups Fight Insurance Crunch, Ft. Worth
Star-Telegram, Oct. 20, 1985, at Al, col. i; Hilder, Small Firms Face Sharp Cost Hikes for Insurance-If
They Can Get It, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1985, at 23, col. 4.
63. Andresky, supra note 62, at 40; Hilder, supra note 62.
64. See Panic in Personal Injury Law, Chi. Trib., Mar. 24, 1986, § 1, at 14, col. 1; Liability Problem:
Solutions Needed, Tyler (Tx.) Morning Telegraph, Jan. 25, 1986, at 1; Liability Cases: Time for Reform,
Dallas Morning News, Dec. 17, 1985, at 18A, col. 1; Capping the Courts, Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1985, at 30,
col. 1; Damage of Damages: Legislature Should Study Liability Awards, Fort-Worth Star-Telegram, Oct. 23,
1985, at 8.
65. Church, Sorry, Your Policy is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16; Gest & Work, Skyhigh Damage
Suits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 27, 1986, at 35.
66. See, e.g., Farrell, The Insurance Crisis: Now Everyone Is In a Risky Business, Bus. WK., Mar. 10,
1986, at 88; Langley, Generous Juries, Wall St. J., May 19, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
67. Casey, Tort Reform Coalitions Flourish in Midwest, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, July 18, 1986, at 14; see
also Barron, supra note 13.
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Understanding how this issue managed to get on both the public and
policy agendas so quickly requires a closer look at the systematic efforts made
to gain agenda access. Civil justice reform and limits on juries have long been
pushed by the insurance industry, manufacturers, and certain professionals,
particularly doctors. There was little success after the passage of medical
malpractice reforms in many states during the previous "crisis" of the mid-
1970's. Starting in 1982, however, insurance trade groups sought renewed
access to the policy agenda. Because few proreform political organizations
remained from the previous crisis in the 1970's, new ones were needed.68
In 1982, for example, a public relations and lobbying campaign called
"Project Justice" began in Illinois. 69 The product of combined insurance,
business, professional, and service provider interests, "Project Justice Illinois,
... [was] considered a prototype tort reform coalition."' 70 It was formed to
disseminate information to the public, to opinion leaders, and to
policymakers, 7 t and to coordinate lobbying efforts, 72 all in the interest of civil
justice reform. As the crisis began making its way onto the public agenda,
similar organizations with symbolically charged names began appearing
across the country. 73
The insurance industry and its trade groups fostered such efforts.7 4
Illinois Project Justice, for example, began with the help of a major trade
association-the Alliance of American Insurers 75-and it was touted as a
model for other states. The trade associations provided these groups with the
agendas, issues, and information necessary to persuade the public, opinion
leaders, and policymakers to accept their characterizations of the situation as a
crisis, along with its attendant causes and remedies. 76
68. Civil Justice Coalitions: A National Awakening, 62 J. AM. INS. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Civil Justice
Coalitions].
69. See Nutter, The Fight for Civil Justice Reform, INS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 3 (Nutter is
president of the Alliance of American Insurers); see also Casey, supra note 67. The Alliance of
American Insurers is located in Schaumburg, Illinois (a Chicago suburb), and has been vigorously
involved in the efforts to gain access to the public agenda for the insurance industry's
characterization of the crisis, its causes, and remedies.
70. Casey, supra note 67, at 14.
71. With regard to Project Justice's efforts to defeat a pre-judgment interest bill in the Illinois
General Assembly in 1986, the National Underwriter reported (approvingly): "Hundreds of publicity
pieces were mailed to the media throughout the state which resulted in supportive news coverage."
Id.
72. Again, in regard to the Illinois pre-judgment interest bill, Casey reported that "The Project
Justice legislative committee actively coordinated lobbying efforts to defeat the bill." Id.
73. Id. at 54-55; Civil Justice Coalitions, supra note 68, at 4-5. We find the establishment of the
following: Indiana Project Justice, Kansas Project Justice, the Pennsylvania Truth and Fairness in
Litigation Committee, the Washington Liability Reform Coalition, Florida Project Civil Justice, the
Wisconsin Coalition for Justice, the Minnesota Tort Reform Coalition, the Ohio Basic Fairness in
Litigation Coalition, the Michigan Committee for Civil Justice Equity, Iowa Project Civil Justice
Reform, Nebraska Project Justice, and the Texas Tort Reform Coalition, which changed its name to
the Texas Civil Justice League.
74. Casey, supra note 67, at 14.
75. Nutter, supra note 69, at 3.
76. The trade associations also provided practical how-to advice on running a successful group.
See When You Need a Coalition: How-to-Do-it Examples from Tort Reform, 62 J. AM. INS. 1 (1986).
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These organizations served as the lens through which to focus and
coordinate the disparate attempts of reform-minded interests to attain access
to the public, and then the policy agenda. If successful, civil justice reform
could be established on the policy agenda of a substantial number of state
legislatures.
Even though the insurance industry associations encouraged the creation
of these organizations as a vehicle for the assault on the public agenda, they
were also vigorously involved in direct lobbying themselves. In 1986, the
Insurance Information Institute ("III") mounted its public relations campaign
in an article entitled "We All Pay the Price." 77 The campaign's purpose was
illustrated by the article's subtitle: "An Industry Effort to Reform Civil
Justice." This industry effort was called the "Civil Justice Campaign" and had
a $6.5 million budget in 1986, a substantial increase over the $1 million per
year budget for public relations in previous years. 78 Its stated purpose was to
reach the general public with the insurance industry's crisis characterization
and its proposed solutions: "[T]he property/casualty insurance industry is
unifying behind a broad-based advertising campaign using network television,
major newspapers and national news magazines to reach the general
public." 79
In the past, the industry's efforts were aimed primarily at elites and
opinion leaders but the strategy changed, "extend[ing] the advertising effort
to the broad general public. We must gain the widest possible awareness and
support before we can expect political leaders to improve the system."80 The
article estimated that the campaign would reach 90 percent of adults in the
country. 8' The III campaign is an excellent illustration of agenda-building.
The campaign conveyed an air of urgency. Built around the concept of
the "Lawsuit Crisis," it employed a series of "eye-catching" dramatic print
advertisements intended to drive home to the general public the idea that "we
all pay the price" for the products of jury decisionmaking.8 2 Advertisement
titles included "The Lawsuit Crisis is Bad for Babies," "The Lawsuit Crisis is
Penalizing School Sports," and "Even the Clergy Can't Escape the Lawsuit
Crisis."8 3
The first advertisement claims that the civil justice system is driving
obstetricians out of business and putting expectant mothers and their babies
at risk. The second blames the civil justice system for forcing local schools to
close down their sports programs. The third advertisement (as if to say "is
nothing sacred?"), faults the system for making clergy reluctant to counsel
members of their congregations.
77. We All Pay the Price: An Industry Effort to Reform Civil justice, INS. REv., Apr. 1986, at 58
[hereinafter We All Pay the Price].
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 59.
83. Id. at 58-59.
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The imagery of the advertisements is very important. Each includes a
photograph superimposed on the print. The first advertisement depicts a
helpless, newborn baby; the second, a forlorn high school football player; and
the third, a worried clergyman. This imagery clearly intends to instill fears
and anxieties, which can be eliminated only through civil justice reform, since
they have nothing to do with the insurance industry. 84 These advertisements
were to appear in the Sunday magazine sections of major newspapers across
the country,8 5 as well as in Reader's Digest, Time, and Newsweek. 86 The "Civil
Justice Campaign" included press and speakers' kits, and "insurance agents
and company personnel [were] being asked to participate in the campaign by
placing additional advertisements in their local media to generate community
interest. "87
While perhaps the best funded and most vigorous, III's Civil Justice
Campaign was by no means the only visible public relations effort, and it may
not have been the most symbolically manipulative. From late 1985 through
1986, the insurance brokerage firm Johnson and Higgins launched an
advertising campaign pointing out the tort system's role in creating the
insurance crisis.
84. Id. at 59.
85. Id.
86. The Lawsuit Crisis Is Bad For Babies, NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1986, at 27; No One Is Immune From
The Lawsuit Crisis, TIME, June 9, 1986, at 32; No One Is Immune From the Lawsuit Crisis, NEWSWEEK, June
9, 1986, at 87; The Lawsuit Crisis Is Penalizing School Sports, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 28, 1986, at 37; The Lawsuit
Crisis Is Penalizing School Sports, TIME, Apr. 28, 1986, at 25; Even The Clergy Can't Escape The Lawsuit
Crisis, TIME, Mar. 31, 1986, at 69; The Lawsuit Crisis is Bad for Babies, TIME, Mar. 31, 1986, at 67 (all
advertisements sponsored by the Insurance Information Institute).
87. We All Pay the Price, supra note 77, at 58-59.
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FIGURE 1
IsThereADoctor
InThe House?
If you had needed
orthopedic surgery early last
summer, upstate New York was
not the place to be.
With over sixty specialists
registered in two populous
counties, less than a handful
would perform surgery.
The reason: massive
malpractice insurance premium
increases.
These increases caused
some doctors to switch from
suit-prone practices to lower-
risk practices Other specialists
opted for early retirement.
New York's physicians
aren't the only ones that are
beleaguered, American Medical
Association data indicate nearly
a quarter of the nations doctors
have been sued. The figure leaps
tosixtypercent forobstetricians,
The malpractice crisis
mirrors many difficulties that
corporate America is having
with its own coverages. The
problems are being driven by
plaintiff zeal to hit it big in the
'litigation lotter,"
Courts continue to
expand the definition ofliability,
edging it ever closer to absolute.
Juries have tripled their
awards in just one decade. Last
year, product liability awards
averaged 1070.000.
Rampant law suits and
megadollar awards are driving
insurance costs up and insurers
As a result, there is far less
coverage available today, and it
costs far more.
That's why companies
cannot easily find liability
coverage fir their directors and
officers And why companies are
worried ab)ut survival in the
absence of critical coverages
And why many doctors are
wondering if the' can continue
in practice.
In our view it is time for
court reform. Legislators must
understand that. in the end, it is
the public who pays for a legal
system that confuses extravagant
"rewards" with legitimaieawards
We must encourage our
lawmakers to act.
JOHNSON
HIGGINS
This advertisement urges court reform as a solution to the unavailability of liability insurance to
cover medical services, caused in part by large jury awards. 8 8
88. Wall St.J., Feb. 14, 1986, at 3. This advertisement appears courtesy of Johnson & Higgins.
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FIGURE 2
Insurance Is Getting
Killed In Seli-defense.
in 1974, the average create this ominous situation than beit The emstenceofinsurance
proluct iability jury award was the field day plaintiffs are having contracts should not he used to
S 3450tJo Last year it was S L07 in court. Last year, one out of justify extravagant awards.
million. every fifteen Americans filed a There is a difference
A shade behind came private civil suit1 16.6 million between an "award" and a
the average medical malpractice suits in state courts alone Wore "reward." Making that distinction
award: $950,000 set, as Juries hand out larger and can mean the difference between
Big numbers. But not as larger awards, judges keep ex- an orginizations having insurance
big as those expected this year panding the definition of liabtity or having to go it alone.
The mounting w 'ae of In our view the courts Clearly it is time for
losses which last sear cost have adopted a theory of entitle- corporations to speak out in
insurers more than 116 for every ment that has led to rampant their own defense.
$00l of premium taken in, has "judicial inflation:' spawning
forced insurers to act defensively, some sad results. Insurers are
Most have stopped offering worried about suts val. Corpora- O N
pollution insurance entirely and tions are stripped of the protec OHNSO N
have cut back severe on other tion thee need. And the pubtic
vital liabilitv coverages, such as pays the bill in the end. ,G S
insurance fordirectorsandofficers. Something has to be done.
Nothing has done more to If that requires legislation, then so
This advertisement mentions the civil jury's contribution to the insurance crisis, pointing out
increases in average awards over time.
8 9
Individual insurance companies also had their own public relations
campaigns. Aetna Insurance, for example, ran a major campaign during
1987. Called "Speaking Out for Civil Justice Reform," it involved an eight-
part series of advertisements to appear in a number of widely circulated
publications along with a direct mail campaign to various opinion leaders.90
The mailing included a personally addressed letter to the opinion leaders
89. Wall St.J., Nov. 19, 1985, at 3. This advertisement appears courtesy ofJohnson & Higgins.
90. The materials used here were from the mailing sent to ProfessorJohn Collins in April 1987
when he was Dean of Management Studies at Sangamon State University, Springfield, I11. Copies are
on file with the author. The advertisements ran in the WVall Street Journal through January and March
of 1987, and in Time, April through June of 1987. These advertisements are reprinted with
permission from Aetna Life and Casualty Company. Aetna's own views on the jury system are
presented in a companion article, Pendell, Enhancing Juror Effectiveness: An Insurers Perspective, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 311.
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signed by William 0. Bailey, vice chairman of Aetna, reprints of the eight
advertisements making up the series, and a summary of a 1987 Louis Harris
poll conducted for Aetna on the civil justice system and tort reform. The
advertisements speak for themselves.
The primary source of the current attack on juries has been a public
relations campaign conducted by those interested in substantial civil reform
and opposed to increased insurance regulation. The campaign has been
waged in order to gain access to the public agenda for a particular
characterization of the "insurance crisis" and acceptance of a particular set of
remedies. Running through this campaign have been a number of common
symbolic themes closely corresponding to the six allegations made against
juries. Most prominent are themes such as: the litigation explosion and the
jury's part in causing it; the idea of change for the worse in the civil justice
system and in the products of jury behavior; and bias and unpredictability in
jury decisionmaking. These themes are used to engender a sense of crisis and
to gain support for the conclusion that immediate and substantial reform in
the civil justice system is needed.
Finally, it must be noted that just as the current "insurance crisis" is not a
new, unique event but a periodic phenomenon, so too are insurance industry
efforts to lobby the public agenda through public relations campaigns
attacking juries and the civil justice system. During the previous "crisis" in
the mid-1970's, there was a similar effort by the insurance industry through
advocacy advertising to influence and shape public opinion in the cause of
civil justice reform. These advertisements also complained of what were
characterized as ridiculously high jury awards and overlitigiousness driving
up insurance costs. 9 1 Now, as then, the attack on juries is essentially a
symbolic part of a larger public policy debate. This function of jury criticism
is further illustrated by a critical examination of the evidence used to convince
people to accept the crisis characterization and its attendant causes.
C. Evidence Used in the Attack on Juries
Three kinds of evidence have been used throughout the attacks on the civil
justice system and the products ofjury decisionmaking: (1) horror stories and
anecdotes about jury verdicts; (2) aggregate data on jury verdicts, usually
dealing with the size of awards; and (3) data reflecting public attitudes toward
juries and the civil justice system. This section examines both the use and
probative value of such evidence.
1. Anecdotes and Horror Stories. Perhaps the most symbolically important and
widely utilized types of evidence on juries are anecdotes and horror stories.
Although the anecdotes relate only individual cases, they are presented as
clear, obvious reflections of a larger truth. The stories portray Americans as
91. See Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards, 65 A.B.A.J. 68 (1979).
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pathologically litigious and juries as willing to award millions of dollars at the
drop of a hat, especially in medical malpractice and products liability cases.
Such evidence has a long history of use; the rhetoric of the current crisis
and its predecessors is built on anecdotes and horror stories. Loftus found
them, for instance, throughout her examination of insurance industry
advocacy advertising during the last crisis in the mid-1970's. 92 These stories
describe the cause of the crisis, the existence of which is always taken for
granted.
The use of horror stories plays an important role in the effort to establish
the crisis idea on the public agenda. In terms of the crisis of the mid-1980's,
such stories began appearing widely in the media by late 1985 and into early
1986.9 3 They also began appearing in the speeches of the crisis advocates at
the same time.94
The horror stories are important because they arouse anxiety in order to
gain public support for a particular characterization of the crisis of which the
products of jury decisionmaking are a primary cause. A few particularly
graphic tales have appeared repeatedly:
The Psychic and the CA T Scan
As recounted in Consumer Reports, "Judith Haimes was awarded close
to $1-million by a Philadelphia jury last March after she said that a
CAT scan at Temple University Hospital made her lose her psychic
abilities." 95 (The judge, however, told the jury to disregard the
assertion of lost psychic powers. The verdict was based on the jury's
determination that the hospital had been negligent in administering
a contrast dye to the woman's brain leading to adverse physical
reactions. 9 6)
The Pinto and the Horse
As told in Forbes, the story goes: "Ford Motors ... lost a $1.5 million
jury decision to the estate of a woman who was killed when her car
hit a horse, causing it to jump through the roof of her 1980 Ford
Pinto."'97 (The horse did not jump through the roof, but rather slid
across it. The car's roof collapsed under the weight of the horse.
Federal safety standards required that a car roof withstand 5000
pounds of pressure in order to protect the occupants in a rollover.
Here the roof collapsed under much less weight. 98)
92. Id,
93. Andresky, supra note 62, at 40; Bacas, Liability. Trying Times, NATION'S Bus., Feb. 1986, at 22;
Gest & Work, supra note 65, at 37; Capping the Courts, supra note 64.
94. Malott, supra note 2; McCormick, supra note 2.
95. The Manufactured Crisis, 51 CONSUMER REP. 544, 546 (1986).
96. Id.
97. Greene, The Hanging Judges of Business, FORBES, Apr. 7, 1986, at 63.
98. See Brill & Lyons, The Not-So-Simple Crisis, AM. LAW., May 1, 1986, at 1; see also Litigation MllYths,
Charleston (W. Va.) Gazette-Mail, June 1, 1986, at 1.
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The Ladder in the Manure
Here, a workman who was shingling a barn set up his ladder in a pile
of manure. The man fell and was injured when the ladder slipped in
the manure. He was awarded $300,000 from the manufacturer of the
ladder because the manufacturer did not warn buyers of the danger
of setting the ladder up in something as slippery as manure. This
story got its widest exposure as part of a 60 Minutes broadcast in early
1986.99 (The manure had nothing to do with the verdict. The jury
found that the ladder broke with less than a 450-pound load on it.
The ladder's safety rating indicated that it could support 1000
pounds. 100)
The Drunk and the Phone Booth
This story was originally circulated as a part of the political campaign
to deny re-election to Rose Bird, then Chief Justice of California. As
told in the Wall Street Journal." "A man is injured when a drunk driver
crashed into a telephone booth and California Chief Justice Rose
Bird rules that the company that designed the booth is liable."' 01
(According to the Charleston (West Virginia) Gazette-Mail,
the booth had been the site of a prior accident, the driver
that hit it was not drunk, the plaintiff-who had one leg
crushed and the other severed-said he had time to get out
of the booth but the door wouldn't open. The California
Supreme Court's ruling merely said the issues he had raised
were proper for a jury to consider. 102)
Such anecdotes, though brief, have great evocative power. These vivid
stories appear consistent with widely held notions about undeserving
plaintiffs, overly sympathetic juries, and the ambulance-chasing attorneys who
take such cases. The sheer outrageousness of the stories summarizes the
crisis and the causal role of juries and the civil justice system. The horror
stories evoke a widespread feeling among citizens that a system permitting
such anomalies to take place must need immediate and fundamental reform.
In particular, these horror stories have been used to show five things: (1)
many, if not most, money damage jury cases are frivolous or, to use Robert
Malott's words, "strain credulity' 0 3 (2) most plaintiffs are undeserving,
having been themselves the cause of their own injuries; (3) juries are overly
sympathetic to individual plaintiffs suing large corporations or other deep
pockets; (4) the defendant is not at fault; and (5) as a result of these
developments the civil justice system has run amok.10 4
99. Litigation Myths, supra note 98, at 1; see also Brill & Lyons, supra note 98.
100. Brill & Lyons, supra note 98.
101. Capping the Courts, supra note 64, at 30; see also McCormick, supra note 2, at 267; Liability
Problem: Solutions Needed, supra note 64.
102. Litigation .Ilyths, supra note 98; see also Strasser, Tort Tales: Old Stoies Never Die, NAT'L L.J., Feb.
16, 1987, at 39, col. 1.
103. Malott, supra note 2, at 180.
104. Daniels & Martin,Jur Verdicts and the "Crisis' in CivilJustice, 11 JUST. Sys. J. 321, 325 (1986).
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As the examples illustrate, however, there is no evidence that these horror
stories accurately portray typical jury verdicts. In fact, the vivid stories tend to
be grossly inaccurate and distorted. Some of them may even have been
fabricated. 10 5 These stories, and their use to gain access to the public agenda,
exemplify the tactical uses of passion mentioned earlier. They appeal to
emotion rather than reason. The tactical use of passion can prevent or
sidetrack any questioning or criticism, creating an emotional attachment to
the position espoused. Vivid examples are useful in such an effort because
they render discourse more immediate and concrete, fostering acceptance of a
particular viewpoint as so obvious and commonsensical that no reasonable
person could disagree.' 0 6
By framing the vivid examples so that by the very nature of things the
assertion made appears to be obviously true,' 0 7 one implies that these
examples accurately reflect a larger truth that everyone accepts. The more
believable the anecdote, and the more anecdotes that can be recounted, the
more credible the greater truth implied, and the less likely that a
counterargument will succeed or even arise.
The tactical use of passion exemplified by the horror stories is an effective
means of agenda-building, as shown by an editorial in the Tyler (Texas) Morning
Telegraph entitled "Liability Problem: Solutions Needed."' 0 8 The editorial
discusses the problems Tyler faced in getting affordable and adequate liability
insurance. The city, the writer says, was not alone in this predicament. The
same situation confronted other local governments, businesses, and
professionals. "Many companies are reported to be going without insurance,
or even going out of business."' 0 9 The cause "is what some call the litigation
explosion-a rising caseload, higher judgments and judicial acceptance of
increasingly outlandish causes of action."' I0
This assertion is followed by four vivid examples. The first example
involves a little league baseball player injured when he was hit on the head by
a fly ball that he was unable to catch. His parents sued the coaches for
negligence in playing their son in the outfield. The jury gave them the
verdict. As a result, the writer reports, the league may have to disband
because of insurance problems, and "coaches everywhere are beginning to
worry about whether their contribution of time is worth the new risk."' ' '
105. Glaberson & Farrell, The Explosion in Liability Lawsuits is Nothing But a Myth, Bus. WK., Apr. 21,
1986, at 24 (one favorite horror story--"the guy who collected $500,000 after he was injured using
his [lawnmower] as a hedge-trimmer ... was a locker room invention, concedes leading tort-reform
lobbyist Victor E. Schwartz"); see also The Manufactured Crisis, supra note 95 (tracing the same anecdote
back to a 1977 Crum and Forster advertisement: "The tale has been repeated dozens of times in
support of the notion that consumers injure themselves foolishly then seek out greedy lawyers to
bring groundless lawsuits. But the story was purely apocryphal. Crum and Forster admitted that it
had no reliable source for the alleged incident.").
106. F. BAILEY, supra note 30, at 125, 140-14 1.
107. Id. at 141.
108. See Liability Problem: Solutions Needed, supra note 64.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
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Another example deals with a burglar who fell through a painted-over
skylight on a public school roof. "He sued the school district and recovered
$26,000 in damages plus a continuing income.""12 A further example
involves a New York City man who attempted suicide by jumping in front of a
subway train. He was injured, but he survived to sue the New York Transit
Authority, which paid him $650,000. The man argued that the driver should
have put the brakes on faster."i 3 In the final example, a man was injured
"when a drunken driver crashed into the phone booth he was using. The
California Supreme Court held that the manufacturer of the phone booth
could be held liable for the man's injuries."' 114
These illustrations, however, did not originate with the editorial writer.
He or she drew them directly from a recent speech by William McCormick of
Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies."15  From the agenda-building
perspective, the editorial writer has a dual function. First, he or she is part of
McCormick's audience, a consumer of information. But more important, he
or she is an opinion leader, whom the insurance industry's public relations
campaign sought to reach in order to spread the proreform gospel to a local
set of consumers.
By communicating the anecdotes and horror stories to such people, the
agenda-builders can create a crisis folklore. It is not unusual to see the same
stories appear five or six times in different places over the course of a year or
so.' 16 Typically, the stories are constructed in the following way: There is a
brief account of the incident and the personal injuries involved with selected
but relevant details, followed by the ubiquitous award-at least a six-figure
award, and often $1 million or more-in a case portrayed as a frivolous action
against a blameless, deep pocket defendant. In addition, a single story is
never recounted alone. The stories always appear in groups that collectively
summarize most, if not all, of the allegations made against juries., 7
Ultimately, horror stories serve multiple functions. They can create the
perception that the anecdote provides just one illustration of a larger
problem. Additionally, "they are enough to show that something is terribly
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. See supra notes 101, 102 and accompanying text.
115. Id.; see also McCormick, supra note 2.
116. The "fat man" case provides an example:
An overweight man with a history of coronary disease suffered a heart attack while trying to
start a Sears lawnmower. He sued Sears, charging that too much force was required to yank
the mower's pull rope. A jury in Pennsylvania awarded him $1.2 million, plus damages of
$550,000 for delays in settling the claim.
Andresky, supra note 62, at 40. In addition to Forbes, in the course of a one-year period (mid-1985 to
mid-1986), the "fat man" story appeared in several other publications. See Church, supra note 65, at
20; Greene, supra note 97, at 63; Loftus, supra note 91, at 69; Malott, supra note 2, at 181 (a widely
distributed speech by a major manufacturing company's board chairman). Only Time also included
the actual title of the case and a factually correct version of the details. The case involved a 32-year-
old medical doctor with no history of heart disease and a product that was defectively manufactured.
After the verdict, Sears settled the case for a substantial amount and dropped its appeal. Church,
supra note 65, at 20.
117. See, e.g., Malott, supra note 2, at 180; McCormick, supra note 2, at 267.
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wrong."' Is The agenda-builders intend the stories to motivate the
appropriate response to such a widespread and pressing problem: political
action. The Tyler Morning Telegraph editorial is a consummate illustration; the
writer concludes, "this is one more area where citizens need to get involved, if
only by being vocal in expressing to their representatives, and demand a
return to some common sense in our system of justice."' 19
2. Aggregate Data on the Products ofJury Decisionmaking. Aggregate data on the
size ofjury awards only occasionally bolster the anecdotal characterization of
a crisis caused by failures in the civil justice system and the products of jury
decisionmaking. These data support the proposition that jury verdicts are too
high, and that support is offered in two principal ways. The first presents
evidence that the typical award in medical malpractice and products liability
cases has increased over time. The second shows that the number of verdicts
equal to or exceeding $1 million has increased over time.
Such hard data used to show that jury awards are too high serve as
symbolic benchmarks around which people will shape their perceptions and
beliefs.' 20 These benchmarks evoke a belief that a crisis exists, that it is
caused by the products of jury decisionmaking, and that it demands
immediate attention. The figures are seldom accompanied by explanations of
where they come from, how they were collected, or how to interpret them.
The probative value of these data is therefore problematic, but for those
concerned or anxious about this crisis such data confirm fears and imply the
obvious solution. In Edelman's view, "[a]s influences on political opinion...
their (hard data's) verifiability is less important than their availability, in view
of the setting of anxiety for many and ambiguity for all in which controversial
policy formation takes place."'21
Together with the numerous horror stories that have circulated, these
dramatic data make an apparently convincing argument. The vivid stories
show us that something is wrong; they are individual representations of a
larger problem. The data showing how awards have changed over time
provide the more precise, scientific, quantitative proof. As with the horror
stories, however, we should be skeptical of the hard data; there is much less
information than meets the eye.
a. Medical malpractice and products liability awards. A constant criticism of
juries is that awards are too high and getting higher. Until the early 1980's,
however, there were no data available to show this. In 1982, the Rand
Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice ("ICJ") began publishing in-house the
results of a series of studies analyzing verdicts.' 22 By the end of 1984, the
118. Liability Problem, supra note 64 (emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., M. EDELMAN, supra note 27, at 29-32.
121. Id. at 30.
122. See, e.g., A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK
COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985); M. PETERSON, CIVIL JURIES IN THE 1980s: TRENDS INJURY TRIALS AND
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insurance industry relied heavily on data from the ICJ research to
demonstrate a significant increase in the average jury award. In one article,
the president of the Alliance of American Insurers uses ICJ data to argue that
"the average amount of jury awards nearly tripled in seven years" during the
1970's. 123 His article includes a dramatic graph taken from an ICJ publication
showing the average jury award staying relatively stable between 1960 and
1970 (below $35,000), and then "skyrocketing" to nearly $75,000 by 1979.124
The use of such general data on jury verdicts, however, quickly gave way to
data on the average award in medical malpractice and products liability
cases.' 25 Even though the latter cases make up a relatively small proportion
of all jury verdicts, they have the highest award structures. Consequently, the
picture focusing on medical malpractice and products liability awards is more
dramatic.
ICJ vigorously circulates its findings on Cook County and San Francisco in
short books or pamphlets and through frequent appearances by staff
members before professional groups, policymaking bodies, and special
commissions established to investigate the crisis and its causes. While the ICJ
findings on medical malpractice and products liability have appeared in a
number of ICJ publications, 126 a good summary is found in a 1987 ICJ
booklet labeled a "special report" and entitled Trends in Tort Litigation. The
Story Behind the Statistics12 7 ("Trends"). According to its foreword, the booklet
initiates "a new series of publications, intended for a wider audience, that will
synthesize the results of previous ICJ studies and place them in a broad policy
context."' 12 8 The booklet is therefore a good source from which to gain a
general picture of the ICJ data and how the ICJ presents them for public
consumption.
Trends focuses on increases in average awards in Cook County and San
Francisco by comparing low-stakes cases like automobile cases, which make
up large proportions of jury dockets, to the highly visible, big-ticket areas of
medical malpractice and products liability. Trends concludes that "[t]he
average has increased even for routine, usually low-stakes cases such as auto.
And in the case of high stakes suits such as product liability and malpractice,
the growth in the average award has been truly explosive, reflecting increases
ranging from 200 to more than 1,000 percent" over the period 1960 to
1984.129 This discussion is accompanied by a series of dramatic graphs
VERDICTS IN CALIFORNIA AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS (1987); M. PETERSON, COMPENSATION OF
INJURIES: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN COOK COUNTY (1984); M. PETERSON & G. PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY:
TRENDS IN TRIALS AND VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960-1979 (1982); M. PETERSON, S.
SARMA, & M. SHANLEY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (1987); M. SHANLEY & M. PETERSON,
COMPARATIVE JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES, 1959-1980
(1983); M. SHANLEY & M. PETERSON, POSTrRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY AWARDS (1987).
123. Nutter, supra note 69, at 5.
124. Id.; see M. PETERSON & G. PRIEST, supra note 122, at 22, Fig. 7.
125. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 104, at 339, 340-43, Table 4.
126. See supra sources at note 122.
127. , See D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA, J. KAKALIK & M. PETERSON, supra note 52.
128. Id. at iii.
129. Id. at 17-18.
[Vol. 52: No. 4
Page 269: Autumn 1989]
highlighting a sharp increase in awards, particularly in the two big-ticket
areas. 1
30
The data upon which this report depends are drawn from awards in Cook
County and San Francisco-only two areas-for malpractice and products
liability cases. These data have been widely cited, however, as authoritative
evidence about broader national trends injury verdicts. Trends even makes this
claim.' 3 1 As a striking example, Litan, Swire, and Winston use ICJ data in a
table that highlights increases in average malpractice and products liability
awards. 132 Although careful in their wording, Litan, Swire, and Winston
imply that the Cook County and San Francisco data reflect national trends in
jury awards: "To be sure, it is difficult to infer a nationwide pattern from data
on jury awards in just two., albeit large, metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, the
trends in these two areas are consistent with the pattern of underwriting
losses recently experienced nationwide by liability insurers."' 133
Even more widely used are data from Jury Verdicts Research, Inc.
("JVR"), on awards in malpractice and products liability cases. The JVR data
are especially attractive because they claim to be a reliable national data
set, 134 and they have been regularly used to show that average awards across
the nation for these two types of cases are skyrocketing. JVR's data on
malpractice and products liability verdicts are generally presented in graphic
form showing dramatic increases in the average award from the 1970's to the
mid-i 980's. 135
Perhaps the most prominent and symbolically important use of the JVR
malpractice and products liability data was in the Reagan Administration's
report from its Tort Policy Working Group in early 1986.136 This report was
the administration's major policy statement on the crisis. It placed the blame
130. Id. at 16-18.
131. Id. at 14.
132. See Litan, Swire & Winston, supra note 22, at 8, Table 1-1.
133. Id. at 10.
134. The Liability Insurance Crisis: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 172, 174 (1986) (statement of P.
Hermann, Chairman of the Board, Jury Verdict Research, Inc.).
135. See, e.g., Church, supra note 65, at 20, 23 (highlighting two graphic presentations of average
verdicts withJVR cited as the source. The first showed the average medical malpractice verdict going
from under $300,000 in 1975 to over $1 million by 1985. The second showed the average products
liability verdict going from under $500,000 in 1975 to well over $1.7 million by 1985); King, supra
note 62 (chart usingJVR data showing increasing average malpractice awards); Press, The Malpractice
Mess, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17, 1986, at 75 (chart on average malpractice awards uses the sameJVR data).
136. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY
WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN
INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986).
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for the crisis on "the explosive growth in tort awards over the last decade," 1 3 7
illustrating the point with two charts using JVR data.' 3 8
b. Million-dollar awards. Perhaps a more important symbolic benchmark
is the emphasis on the increase in the number of $1 million-plus awards. The
very complexity of malpractice and products liability issues may cloud the
symbolic impact of large awards in these cases. Focusing on the number of $1
million verdicts provides a simpler and therefore more evocative symbol
lacking technical overtones. One million dollars is a readily recognizable
benchmark that requires no explanation; it has special expressive power,
representing an amount of money most people can only dream about and feel
they can never obtain.
The primary source of data on $1 million verdicts isJVR, whose figures are
widely used primarily in the form of dramatic graphs. 139 JVR figures have
been so prominently used to show that jury awards are too high not because
these figures are authoritative, but because they are so available. JVR is a for-
profit company that produces and sells information to attorneys and others on
jury verdicts. JVR does much of its marketing by direct mail, and the
company is also vigorous in issuing a constant stream of releases on the
information it gathers on jury verdicts. These releases cover an amazingly
broad range of topics, from the number of $1 million verdicts to beauty parlor
malpractice verdicts.' 40  As a result of JVR's vigorous self-promotion for
marketing purposes, its data are widely available in an easy-to-use form.
c. Problems in the aggregate data. The JVR data have attracted much
criticism, perhaps because they have been vigorously pushed by the company
137. Id. at 35; see also Pear, Administration Submits Plan to Reduce Damage Awards, N.Y. Times, May 1,
1986, at B9, col. 1; Richey, Administration Proposes New Limits on Product Liability Awards, Christian Sci.
Monitor, May 2, 1986, at 5, col.1 ("The Reagan administration believes that there is an insurance
crisis, and that it has been brought about in large part by an 'explosion' of huge liability judgments
awarded by juries to injured plaintiffs.").
138. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, supra note 136, Chart D (Average Medical Malpractice Jury
Verdict) and Chart E (Average Product Liability Jury Verdict).
139. See, e.g., INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INCORPORATED, INSURER PROFITABILITY-THE FACTS
(1986) (a "fact-based review of the property/casualty insurance industry" [id. at 3], prepared by an
insurance industry organization and intended to counter the industry's critics. The increase in $1
million verdicts was one of the important facts to explain. Figure 20 in the booklet is "Number of
Huge Verdicts Increasing," [id. at 28] and the accompanying text reads: "From 1974 to 1984, the
number of million-dollar verdicts rose dramatically." [Id.]). TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, supra
note 136, Chart F (using JVR data to depict data on $1 million verdicts in malpractice cases and in
products liability cases); Gest & Work, supra note 65 (graph shows the number of $1 million verdicts
going from 7 in 1970, to 27 in 1975, to 134 in 1980, and to 401 in 1984); King, supra note 62 (a
similar graph illustrating a story on malpractice); Langley, GenerousJuries, Wall St.J., May 19, 1986, at
1, col. 1 (graph based onJVR figures depicts the number of $1 million verdicts for the period 1965 to
1984 as less than 50 per year until the middle-1970's, increasing dramatically to 400 per year by
1984).
140. Growing Number of Beauty Parlor Customers Dissatisfied with Treatment, JVR release May 1986 (on
file with the author).
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and widely used 14 1 as reliable indicators of national trends. 142 According to
Russell Localio,JVR does not have data on alljury verdicts nationwide; it does
not appear to have a systematic and valid sampling scheme, nor a reliable way
of collecting data:
JVR, by its own admission, attempts but cannot possibly succeed in compiling all
verdicts. The reported sample might reflect a representative subset of all verdicts and
might have the same average as the population. That result is unlikely, however.
More likely, JVR receives notice of all large verdicts and misses some of the more
modest awards. The JVR sample might therefore be biased upwards .... 143
JVR relies on court clerks, newspaper reporters, attorneys, law students,
newspaper clipping services, and local verdict reporting services to gather
information on jury verdicts. JVR believes that it receives meaningful data for
most verdicts and is confident that the information it receives "constitutes more
than a representative sampling."' 44  When JVR figures are used as
ammunition in a political battle, therefore, they should be received
skeptically.
In addition, in its releases JVR provides no baseline information on the
total number of verdicts that allows for a meaningful interpretation of the $1
million verdict data. Saying there are 300, 400, or even 500 such awards in a
given year, without some reference point, is not useful. It is quite possible,
for instance, that the absolute number of $1 million verdicts can rise while the
proportion of such awards declines. Worse, the JVR data for $1 million
verdicts, as well as for malpractice and products liability verdicts, are not
expressed in constant dollars, which potentially undercuts the entire meaning
of the data. Accepted practice expresses trend data for monetary values in
constant dollars as a way of adjusting for the effects of inflation. This allows
the analysis to separate out and concentrate on those changes over time not
simply caused by inflation. More $1 million awards, for instance, would be
expected in 1985 than in 1970 simply because of inflation. An award of about
$360,000 in 1970 dollars is equivalent to a $1 million award in 1985 dollars.
More appropriately, the issue should be phrased as trends in monetary awards
beyond those caused by inflation.
Another problem plaguing both the JVR and the ICJ data is the use of
average awards as an indicator of the typical award. In Localio's words, "the
purpose of using the average of a collection of observations is to summarize
the location or typical value with as much precision as possible .... Where
the tails of the distribution are straggling or unsymmetrical, however, the
average fails to indicate the center."1 45 The distribution forjury awards is not
even close to a bell-shaped or normal curve. The distribution is strongly
14 1. See Localio, Variations on $962,258. The Misuse of Data on Medical Malpractice, 13 LAW MED. &
HEALTH CARE 126 (1985); Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg, Information on Malpractice: A Review of
Empirical Research on Major Policy Issues, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 90.
142. The Liability Insurance Crisis, supra note 134.
143. Localio, supra note 141, at 126.
144. The Liability Insurance Crisis, supra note 134.
145. Localio, supra note 141, at 127.
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skewed with the bulk of awards crowded towards the low end, making the
average or mean a very poor indicator of what is typical.
For example, using data from Cook County (not collected by ICJ) from
1981 to 1985 (number of all verdicts, 4,181; number of cases in which
plaintiffs win, 2,431), the average was $172,541 (in 1985 dollars), while the
median award was only $10,382 (in 1985 dollars). But 88 percent of all
verdicts in which plaintiffs won at least $1 were lower than the average
award. 146 This illustrates how skewed toward the low dollar end this
distribution is, and how distorting the mean can be.
Interestingly, both JVR and ICJ report medians and ranges, but both
emphasize the more dramatic averages rather than the more modest medians.
The latter are the appropriate measures to use. For instance, the authors of
Trends mention median awards briefly, but they quickly switch to discussing
average awards, which show more dramatic increases in the size of awards.
Their subsequent analysis then focuses exclusively on the measure that shows
the most dramatic increases for all types of cases. 147 Additionally, while JVR's
detailed discussions of awards may include information beyond the mean, its
widely circulated press releases talk only of the averages. For example, a
recent release entitled "Unnecessary Surgery Awards Appear to be on the
Rise" touts a "recent publication by Jury Verdict Research, Inc.... [which]
found that the average awards for patients who alleged they had undergone
unnecessary surgery have increased."'' 48
The probative value of the JVR data in general is substantially undermined
by the congressional testimony of JVR's chairman, Philip J. Hermann. In his
1986 appearance before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the
House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, Hermann said:
"JVR has neither asserted nor published any conclusions that the average size
of jury verdicts has recently skyrocketed. Although verdicts, as well as many
other items, have increased substantially over the years, our studies do not
support any claim of recently escalating jury verdict awards,"' 149
The ICJ studies, especially in their emphasis on Cook County, have a
different problem. The ICJ focuses exclusively on case studies, and no more.
Case studies are a valuable way of gaining a detailed understanding of
complex and interrelated events by putting a microscope on one or two
places. As a practical matter, broad-based studies covering a large number of
sites cannot be as richly detailed as a case study. But one cannot generalize
from a case study to some larger population. 50
Since the ICJ studies are case studies of two sites, with particular emphasis
on just one of them, it is inappropriate to generalize from them in order to
146. These data are taken from an ongoing series of research projects on civil juries being
conducted at the American Bar Foundation; see Daniels & Martin, supra note 104, at 328.
147. D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA, J. KAKALIK & M. PETERSON, supra note 52, at 14-16.
148. Unnecessary Surgery Awards Appear to be on the Rise, JVR release June 1986 (on file with the
author).
149. The Liability Insurance Crisis, supra note 134, at 2.
150. R. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 21 (1984).
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make-or even imply-statements about broader patterns across the country
with regard to the products ofjury decisionmaking. Unfortunately, a number
of people, including those of the ICJ, have made exactly such generalizations
based on ICJ data, especially those for Cook County.15 ' Despite admitting the
theoretical limitations of case studies, authors like Litan, Swire, and Winston
ignore those limitations and use the ICJ data to suggest conclusions about
national patterns injury verdicts.' 52
In fact, other data for medical malpractice verdicts show very different
trends. To illustrate, Table 1 presents data on malpractice verdicts for the
years 1970 to 1985 for four jurisdictions: Dallas County (Dallas), Texas;
Jackson County (Kansas City), Missouri; Cook County (Chicago), Illinois; and
DuPage County (suburban Chicago), Illinois. It shows the number of
malpractice jury cases, the number of successful malpractice jury verdicts
(cases in which the plaintiff wins at least $1), the malpractice success rate
(percentage of malpractice cases in which the plaintiff wins at least $1), and
the median award for successful cases expressed in 1985 dollars. Because of
the small numbers of successful cases per year, the data are grouped into four
four-year 'periods. 153
Table 1 shows distinctly different patterns for these sites. In Dallas, the
median malpractice award was just over $100,000 in 1970-73. It dropped
dramatically in 1974-77, and then began to creep up again slowly over time.
The median award, however, reached a level only slightly more than one-half
of the 1970-73 level. In Dallas, then, there is no clear picture of consistently
and dramatically increasing awards for the period 1970 to 1985. In Jackson
County, the median award was consistently higher, and it followed a different
pattern over time. It was a stepped, downward trend over the four time
periods. There was a dramatic decrease from 1970-73 to 1974-77, when the
median dropped by 52.5 percent. The median increased again in 1978-81
(but to nowhere near the 1970-73 level), only to drop sharply once more in
1982-85 (an 82 percent decrease from 1978-81). There was, then, no pattern
of dramatic increase in Jackson County, either.
Two conclusions emerge from these patterns in Dallas and Jackson
Counties. First, of course, there is no clear-cut trend at either site showing
consistently and dramatically increasing awards. Second, the two sites differ
distinctly-both over time and at points in time. Since the inter-site
differences far outweigh any similarities, one would not want to hazard any
151. D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA,J. KAKALIK & M. PETERSON, supra note 52, at 14 ("We draw on these
analyses [the previous ICJ studies] in the following discussion of trends injury awards. The data are
specific to San Francisco and Cook County, and we would not expect to observe the same medians
and means in all the jurisdictions in the country .... However, the data are valuable because they
are currently the only data available in the United States that allow us to discuss long-term trends in
trial outcomes. And the similarity of trends between the two jurisdictions leads us to believe that the
trends we are observing may hold nationwide.").
152. Litan, Swire & Winston, supra note 22.
153. Data from all four sites are from an ongoing series of research projects on civil juries being
conducted at the American Bar Foundation. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 104.
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TABLE 1
TRENDS IN MALPRACTICE JURY CASES IN FOUR COUNTIES, 1970-85
N of Medical N of Success Median Award
Year Malpractice Cases Successful Cases Rate (1985 dollars)
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
1970-73 19 4 21.1 $104,559
1974-77 35 8 22.9 16,156
1978-81 29 6 20.9 42,589
1982-85 33 6 18.2 57,655
TOTAL 116
JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI
1970-73 11 3 27.3 $603,950
1974-77 11 4 36.4 286,950
1978-81 22 7 31.8 387,760
1982-85 31 12 38.7 69,850
TOTAL 75
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
1970-73 48 18 37.5 $106,800
1974-77 63 21 33.3 208,153
1978-81 53 14 26.4 113,025
1982-85 117 39 33.3 194,326
TOTAL 281
DuPAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS
1970-73 0 0 - -
1974-77 7 3 42.9 $130,800
1987-81 4 1 25.0 66,000
1982-85 27 5 18.5 17,280
TOTAL 38
generalizations about nationwide trends based on the data from these two
counties.
Their differences, and the difference between these two sites and Cook
County, should be sufficient to cast serious doubt on the propriety of
generalizing national trends from the ICJ data. To drive home this most
important point, Table 1 also presents data on DuPage County, an affluent,
suburban county of over 700,000 people outside of Chicago. In DuPage
there were no malpractice jury cases for the first time period. The median
award for the three successful cases in 1974-77 was $130,800. In 1978-81, the
single winning malpractice jury case had an award of $66,000; and in 1982-85
the median was only $17,280.154
154. Id.
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3. Polls and Public Opinion. The third type of evidence used in the attack on
juries differs from the first two because it pertains to public opinion about
juries, the civil justice system, and reform, rather than to juries per se. Of
course, there is no necessary connection between the actual products of jury
decisionmaking and public opinion. A characterization need not be accurate
in order to be accepted. More imporant is the symbolic value of these opinion
polls-that is, how they are interpreted. Typically, the polls have been used
to show that there is growing and substantial public support for the critics'
crisis characterization and for their preferred reforms.
To the extent that the polls do show increasing public support for the
crisis characterization, they can also be seen (and used) as evidence of
successful agenda-building. Returning to Cobb and Elder, we see that three
things need to happen for an issue to gain access to the public agenda: (1) the
issue must attract widespread public awareness; (2) it must become a shared
concern of a sizable proportion of the public that some type of action is
required to deal with the issue; and (3) it must become a shared perception
that the issue is an appropriate concern for some governmental unit and falls
within the bounds of its authority. 155
The opinion polls indicate that these criteria have been met and the crisis
characterization has gained access to the public agenda-or at least this is
what the critics claim. For instance, William Bailey commented on the results
of a Harris poll in Aetna's direct mailing to opinion leaders: "I think you'll
agree that public opinion clearly supports proposals for some very
meaningful changes in laws affecting civil liability."' 56 A flyer highlighting
some of the opinion poll data was also included in the mailing. It echoed
Bailey's statement and laid down a challenge: "The evidence clearly shows
Americans think something is wrong. And when Americans see something.
wrong, they usually fix it."157
The Aetna flyer provides an additional indication of agenda-building by
showing the connections among different parts of Aetna's efforts to gain
access to the public agenda, particularly the eight-part series of ads run by
Aetna in a variety of publications. The wording is especially telling. The flyer
said: "To help people better understand what's wrong with the system, we
recently ran a series of ads on the subject. And the mail we received mirrored
the Harris Poll findings. In fact, more than 95% of those who wrote favored
reform." 158
Starting in early 1986, the first of what would become a series of public
opinion polls on the insurance crisis was reported in a business publication. 59
The report told of a 1985 survey done for the Insurance Information Institute
by Cambridge Reports. The survey found that 23 percent of the respondents
155. R. COBB & C. ELDER, supra note 37.
156. Letter from William 0. Bailey to Professor John Collins, supra note 90.
157. See supra note 90.
158. Id.
159. Herbert, Survey Eyes Litzgation Explosion, J. CoM., Jan. 2, 1986, at 10A, col. 3.
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thought greed caused the litigation explosion; 19 percent blamed overzealous
lawyers for the increase; and large settlements and high verdicts were cited by
only 7 percent.
Later polls showed larger proportions of the respondents blaming
juries.' 60 All the polls emphasized similar symbolic themes, such as the
connections between undeserving plaintiffs, greedy lawyers, overly
sympathetic and generous juries, and a litigation explosion. These symbolic
themes have appeared throughout the campaign to gain access to the public
agenda.
Later in 1986, another Cambridge Reports survey found that 64 percent of
the respondents thought that too many lawsuits were being filed; 56 percent
thought the civil justice system was awarding too much money to successful
plaintiffs. 16 In mid-1986, Louis Harris, Inc., reported that 80 percent of the
respondents thought that lawyers looking for high contingency fees were
responsible for the presumed flood of litigation; 77 percent blamed the crisis
on greedy plaintiffs; 71 percent blamed laws which make it too easy to sue;
and 62 percent thought the problem was with large settlements. 162
In 1987, Harris conducted a poll for Aetna Insurance Company, and Aetna
circulated the results widely in a public relations campaign and in its direct
mailing to opinion leaders. The mailing summarized the poll's results
regarding the excesses of the civil justice system and the acceptability of
certain major reform proposals. 163
In terms of the civil justice system, the summary said "Americans believe
that it is overused . . . . People also are dissatisfied with the rising cost of
lawsuits, failure by the courts to hear cases promptly, and what is. seen as a
growing tendency by the courts and juries to give excessive damage
awards."' 164 More specifically, "53 percent of Americans believe that the size
of awards for damages has increased faster than inflation. Forty-five percent
of Americans believe that the size of awards or verdicts in personal injury
cases has been excessive, compared with only 16 percent who think most
awards are insufficient." 16 5
In terms of reform proposals, the survey reported that "about half of the
American public believes either that the civil justice system needs to be rebuilt
completely because so much is wrong with it (14 percent), or that it has some
major problems which can be corrected only through fundamental changes
(34 percent)."' 166 With respect to the products of jury decisionmaking the
survey reported that:
160. Tort Reform Gains Support From Public, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Aug. 8, 1986, at 22; Louis HARRIS
& Assocs., INC., SUMMARY: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND TORT LAW
REFORM (survey results included in a mailing sent to Professor John Collins, supra note 90).
161. Tort Reform Gains Support from Public, supra note 160, at 22.
162. Id.
163. Louis HARRIS & Assocs., INC., supra note 160.
164. Id. at 2.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 4.
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By 73-23%, Americans would accept having judges give jurors specific guidelines
about how much damages should be awarded in a particular type of case.
By 62-33%, Americans would accept having a judge, instead of the jury, set the
amount of damages after the jury has decided a law suit.
By 66-28%, Americans would accept a $250,000 cap on pain and suffering and other
noneconomic damages. 1
6 7
The opinion poll data can be viewed from two perspectives. First, and
most immediately as Bailey's letter demonstrates, the opinion polls can be
seen as evidence of successful access to the public agenda. The message to
opinion leaders and policymakers alike is that the crisis characterization has
attracted widespread public awareness; that a sizable proportion of the public
feels that action-perhaps dramatic action-is needed to deal with the crisis;
and that it is the government that should do something by reforming the civil
justice system. Not coincidentally, in this view the public supports the kinds
of reforms the critics have proffered.
This message, however, is somewhat problematic. Its force comes from
the way the opinion poll data are interpreted-as evidence of the acceptance
of the crisis characterization and the critics' ideas on reform. These data, of
course, are amenable to alternative interpretations less favorable to the critics'
political agenda. For instance, the idea that 53 percent of Americans feel that
the size of awards has increased faster than inflation can be recast to show that
almost one-half of Americans feel that awards have not kept up with inflation.
That only 16 percent of Americans think awards are insufficient can be turned
around to say that over 80 percent. think awards are sufficient. With regard to
reform proposals, the opinion data noted above can be rephrased to say that
over 86 percent of Americans feel that the civil justice system does not need
complete rebuilding, and that 66 percent feel there are no major problems in
the system.
Even though problematic, the force of the message conveyed by the
opinion poll data becomes evident when their use is viewed from a second
perspective. The polls are potentially powerful and evocative political
symbols that appeal to prejudices and unexamined assumptions. Like the
aggregate data, they too present symbolic benchmarks-hard data-around
which people can shape their perceptions of the crisis. Such use of poll data is
perhaps the ultimate tactical use of passion, combining the symbolic appeal to
feeling rather than thought with the power of scientific and quantitative
certainty. In effect, this use of polls gives scientific verification to common
sense-those symbolic themes that have appeared throughout the political
debate over crisis and reform. As a matter of symbolic politics, it is crucial
how this common sense is verified and how it attempts to cut off any further
systematic examination of the substantive issues regarding juries and the civil
justice system-an examination that may well pose a serious challenge to the
crisis characterization.
167. Id. at 7.
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It is important to re-emphasize that the poll data have nothing to do with
the substance of the matters at issue. They have nothing to tell about what
juries actually do, about plaintiffs and lawyers, about the amount of litigation,
or about the workings of the civil justice system. The poll data tell only about
people's responses to a set of questions that are designed to elicit their
opinions, not their informed assessments of jury competence and related
issues. Moreover, the wording of the questions can mask a bias that skews
responses in the desired direction. For instance, asking people which of a list
of factors is most responsible for causing the litigation explosion or the
insurance crisis presumes the existence of those factors, of the explosion, and
of the crisis.
The critics' use of such data represents an alternative way of verifying
their characterization of the situation-vox populi. The power of this form of
verification is based on the principle "where there's smoke there must be
fire." If everyone agrees that a crisis exists, then a crisis must exist. If public
opinion and the critics' characterization are consistent, then surely there can
be no disagreement and no need for empirical investigation ofjuries and the
civil justice system. It is in this sense that the use of polls represents the
ultimate use of passion, the ultimate common sense argument. If everyone
knows about and agrees on the problems in the civil justice system, there is no
need for further examination or discussion, only action, since ."when
Americans see something wrong, they usually fix it."168 How could anyone
with any common sense deny the accuracy of the critics' characterization?
How could any policymaker not take immediate action? To disagree, one
must challenge not only the wisdom of the American public but science as
well.
The manipulation of poll data as a tactical use of passion cuts even deeper.
Their use not only verifies the common sense nature of the critics'
characterization and cuts off any further examination; their use also sanctifies
for the mass public the symbolic themes that have been used to reinforce the
prejudices and unexamined assumptions to which the critics have appealed.
One's feelings about undeserving plaintiffs, greedy lawyers, overgenerous
juries, and the like are therefore acceptable and appropriate. The polls'
message to the mass public is that most of one's fellow Americans agree,
which makes it easier for people to accept the characterization and harder to
reject or even criticize it. Additionally, in reinforcing and giving approval to
those symbolic themes and unexamined assumptions, the polls help to foster
and perpetuate the sense of anxiety and crisis upon which the critics have
relied.
From the perspective of symbolic politics and agenda-building, the
opinion poll data should therefore be viewed with great skepticism and
caution. More than anything, the polls illustrate the successful use of passion
in agenda-building.
168. See supra note 90.
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IV
CONCLUSION
The current attacks on civil juries cannot be understood and evaluated in a
political vacuum. The attacks are an integral part of a concerted campaign
aimed at the enactment of substantial changes in the civil justice system that
would benefit the insurance industry, physicians, certain manufacturers, and
others. The campaign and the attacks arose in response to serious problems
in the adequacy, availability, and affordability of liability insurance in the mid-
1980's. Two competing and mutually exclusive characterizations of this
situation emerged, and the winning characterization will determine the nature
of subsequent public policy responses to the situation.
One side sees the problem as a consequence of the recurring boom and
bust nature of the insurance industry's business cycle. They argue that the
causes of this cycle lie within the industry itself, and that the solution is
greater regulation of the insurance industry. The other side-primarily,
though not exclusively, the insurance industry-labels this situation as a crisis
and clearly blames the civil justice system. The remedy for this crisis is
fundamental reform of the civil justice system. Characterizing the situation in
this way also helps to divert attention away from the causal role of the
insurance industry's boom and bust business cycle, and away from a solution
of substantially greater industry regulation. The attacks on jury competence
are a part of the crisis rhetoric built into this strategy. Crisis rhetoric has been
used in the effort to gain access first to the public agenda and then to the
policy agenda.
The political strategy underlying the attacks on jury competence undercuts
the substance of such criticisms. Three kinds of evidence have been regularly
used to highlight the failures of juries: horror stories, aggregate data, and
opinion polls. Critically examining how each type of evidence is used in the
policy debate over the crisis reveals how little the evidence actually tells us
about the products of jury decisonmaking. There is no indication that the
widely used horror stories accurately portray typical jury cases. In fact, some
stories are grossly inaccurate and distorted, and some were apparently
fabricated. They are examples of the tactical use of passion, and consequently
are important in the policy debate not because of their accuracy but because
they arouse anxiety and public support for a particular characterization of
juries and the civil justice system.
Aggregate data have been used to demonstrate the excesses of juries in
two principal ways: by presenting data on trends in awards for the high
profile areas of medical malpractice and products liabihy; and by presenting
data on trends in verdicts of $1 million or more. Neither, however, holds up
under examination as an accurate picture of the products of jury
decisionmaking. But accuracy may not be the real aim of such evidence
either. These hard data serve as symbolic benchmarks around which people
can shape their perceptions of the crisis. These benchmarks are used to
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arouse concern by evoking a belief that a crisis exists, that juries are largely to
blame, and that immediate political action is required.
Finally, the opinion poll data actually tell us nothing about juries per se.
They represent a different message and a different way of verifying the crisis
characterization. They tell us not that juries and the civil justice system
actually have run amok, but that many people so believe. In other words, the
message is that a sizable proportion of the public accepts a particular
characterization of the situation and its causes, one consistent with the
interests of the civil justice reformers. In this sense, the polls are an
indication of successful agenda-building. In addition, the polls represent an
alternative way of verifying the crisis characterization-vox populi. In doing so,
their use represents the ultimate tactical use of passion-appealing to feeling
rather than thought and giving unexamined assumptions about juries and civil
justice a scientific and quantitative aura, thereby cutting off the need for
further systematic examination. Additionally, the results of the opinion polls
act as symbolic benchmarks that help reinforce unexamined assumptions
about the civil justice system while perpetuating the sense of anxiety and
crisis.
This analysis of the attack on juries suggests that policy formation with
regard to the civil justice system does not necessarily reflect what actually
happens in the system. Instead, interest groups have made a concerted effort
to work for policy changes that benefit them. The allegations about juries
have been useful in this process not because they are accurate, but because
they have been a convenient device for building support for those policy
changes and for shifting attention away from the insurance industry itself as a
potential cause of the crisis, thereby derailing efforts to increase insurance
regulation. As the debate over these issues continues, policymakers should
bear this analysis in mind as they seek appropriate solutions to the periodic
problems in the adequacy, affordability, and availability of insurance.
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